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Abstract
The adoption of agriculture during the Neolithic triggered the rst demographic explosion in
history. When fertility returned to its original level, early farmers found themselves more poorly
nourished than hunter-gatherers and working longer hours to make ends meet. We develop a
dynamic, price-theoretic model that rationalizes these events: in the short-run, fertility and
utility increase; in the long-run, consumption, leisure, and utility fall below their initial levels.
This, we argue, can be attributed to the rise in child labor productivity that followed the
adoption of agriculture. Counter-intuitively, an increase in the productivity of children may
lead to a permanent reduction in utility.
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1 Introduction
The shift from hunting and gathering to agriculture, a transition known as the Neolithic Revolution,
was followed by a sharp increase in fertility (Bocquet-Appel, 2002). Global population increased a
hundred times faster during the Neolithic Revolution than during the preceding hunting-gathering
period (Hassan, 1973). In the course of a few centuries, typical communities grew from about 30
individuals to 300 or more, and population densities increased from less than one hunter-gatherer
per square mile to 20 or more farmers (Johnson and Earle, 2000, pp. 43, 125, 246).
This demographic explosion has been attributed to two main causes. First, food was available to
early farmers in unprecedented quantities (Price and Gebauer, 1995). Second, having children was
cheaper for early farmers than for hunter-gatherers, since caring for children interfered more with
hunting and gathering than with farming (Locay, 1983, pp. 6098). More importantly, the children
of farmers contributed substantially more to food production than the children of hunter-gatherers
(Kramer and Boone, 2002).
Although early farmers produced food in larger quantities, they were more poorly nourished
and su¤ered from poorer health than did hunter-gatherers (Armelagos et al., 1991; Cohen and
Armelagos, 1984). The archeological record of the Eastern Mediterranean region reveals that male
hunter-gatherers who reached adulthood had a life expectancy of 33 years, while females who reached
adulthood had a life expectancy of 29 years. After the Neolithic Revolution, the life expectancy
of adult males dropped to 32 years, and the life expectancy of adult females dropped to 25 years.
Average statures also diminished, from 177 to 165 centimeters among males, and from 165 to 152
centimeters among females (Angel, 1975).
To make matters worse, the average daily working time increased upon the arrival of agriculture.
Ethnographic studies suggest that hunter-gatherers worked less than six hours per day, whereas
primitive horticulturists worked seven hours on average, and intensive agriculturalists worked nine
(Sackett, 1996, pp. 33842).
We develop a dynamic, price-theoretic model that makes sense of these perplexing events, pro-
vided that a set of plausible conditions hold. Of these, the key conditions are: (1) ceteris paribus,
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fertility increases with wage, and (2) wage decreases with population size. Together, conditions 1
and 2 constitute the classical Malthusian-Ricardian assumptions.
The story begins with a tribe of hunter-gatherers, whose members derive utility from consump-
tion, leisure, and childbearing. The tribe is in demographic equilibrium: given his wage (the
amount of food he can produce per unit of time) and the prices he faces, each tribesman chooses
to reproduce at the replacement rate. At some point, the tribe discovers agriculture and adopts it
because doing so increases the wage and the productivity of children. As a result, the demographic
equilibrium breaks down: the tribesmen increase their fertility above the replacement rate, and
the population begins to grow. Wages, which are negatively correlated with population size, pro-
gressively fall; and, as the wages fall, fertility falls accordingly. Eventually, fertility returns to the
replacement rate and the population restabilizes, only now at higher numbers. The wage, on the
other hand, settles below its original level. The later generations of farmers reproduce at the same
rate, consume less food, and work longer hours than the hunter-gatherers. Hence, while adopting
agriculture increases the utility of the rst farmers, the utility of the later generations of farmers
turns out to be lower than the utility of their hunter-gatherer ancestors.
The increase in the productivity of children, which amounts to a fall in their price, drives the
results of our model. Counter-intuitively, an increase in the productivity of children may cause
a permanent reduction in utility. This result distinguishes our work from previous attempts to
explain the Neolithic Revolution. In other work, enhancements in food production technology play
the main role. In our model, these have only one e¤ect in the long-run, namely population growth.
Our model sheds some light on a central puzzle in the literature: did agriculture emerge out of
opportunity? Or were our ancestors forced into farming? Traditional scholarship regards agriculture
as highly desirable: once humans discovered agriculture and recognized the potential productivity
gains, beginning to farm was an obvious decision (Trigger, 1989). In recent times, this idea has
been called into question, partly because taking up farming reduced the standard of living of our
ancestors (Harlan, 1992; Sahlins, 1974). The reduction in the standard of living suggests that our
ancestors did not become farmers willingly. Instead, they may have been forced into agriculture by
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some external pressure [e.g., overpopulation (Binford, 1968; Flannery, 1969) or the overkill of the
mammoths and other game (Smith, 1975)].
We propose a third, hybrid answer to the puzzle one that is purely economic. Since wages
decrease as population increases, a generations fertility imposes a negative externality to subsequent
generations. Increased child productivity is equivalent to a subsidy on childbearing that accentuates
the intergenerational externality. The rst farmers were lured into agriculture; they beneted from
the higher wages and from this subsidy. But the demographic explosion that ensued impoverished
later generations. Still, members of later generations were forced to remain farmers for two reasons.
First, reverting to hunting and gathering would have reduced their own wages even further. Second,
renouncing the subsidy on childbearing would have made them even worse o¤. More productive
children were an asset to the early adopters of agriculture. In the long-run, however, the increase
in the productivity of children pushed primitive societies deeper into the Malthusian trap.
1.1 Related literature
A variety of theories have been advanced to explain the emergence of agriculture. These range
from excessive hunting (Smith, 1975), to warfare (Rowthorn and Seabright, 2008), to climatic
variation (Dow et al., 2009). Theories on the adoption of agriculture have been extensively surveyed
by Weisdorf (2005) and Sharp and Weisdorf (2009). We will thus limit this review to previous
explanations for the loss of welfare that followed the Neolithic Revolution.
Locay (1989) argues that substitution e¤ects can explain the events of the Neolithic. According
to Locay, the fall in the price of children motivated early farmers to substitute fertility for consump-
tion and leisure. He maintains that these changes were welfare enhancing, since the fall in the price
of children expanded the farmers feasible set. According to Weisdorf (2004), early farmers gave
up their leisure time in exchange for goods produced by an emerging class of non-food-producing
specialists (e.g., craftsmen and bureaucrats). Marceau and Myers (2006) model the fall in con-
sumption and leisure as a tragedy of the commons. Locay (1989), Weisdorf (2004), and Marceau
and Myers (2006) assume that population remains constant during the transition to agriculture.
Demographics plays no role in their models.
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Two papers, one by Weisdorf (2008) and the other by Robson (2008), explore the inuence of
demographics on the loss of welfare experienced by early farmers.
Weisdorf (2008) incorporates Malthusian-Ricardian population principles into a model with two
sectors: hunting and agriculture. In his model, the higher productivity of agriculture motivates its
adoption, but the subsequent population growth overrides the productivity gain. Weisdorf implicitly
assumes that peoples only desire in life is to reproduce and that they will work as many hours as it
takes to maximize their fertility. He also assumes that food consumption is an increasing function
of the energy spent at work, which explains why farmers have to work more than hunter-gatherers.
Robson (2008) develops a model with two goods: children and childrens health. In Robsons
model, infectious diseases become more prevalent as population increases. This makes the health of
children more expensive for farmers than for the (less populous) hunter-gatherers. Farmers respond
by having more children and investing less in their health than did their predecessors.
2 A model of agriculture adoption
2.1 Model setup
A tribe has N > 0 identical adult members or tribesmen. A tribesman chooses food consumption
c > 0, leisure r > 0, and the number of his children n > 0 in order to maximize a certain utility
function u(c; r; n), which is increasing in all its arguments.1
The tribesman is subject to the following budget constraint:
w(A;N)  (T   r + n)  c+ n:
Function w(A;N) > 0 is the tribesmans wage,measured in units of food, T > 0 is his disposable
time, and T   r > 0 is his labor supply. The wage is increasing in a technology parameter A
and decreasing in population N ; these are the classical Ricardian assumptions. Using subscripts
1There is ample evidence that pre-modern peoples deliberately chose the number of their children. The methods
they used included abstinence, celibacy, prolonged breast-feeding, abortion, and infanticide (Douglas, 1966; Cashdan,
1985).
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to denote derivatives, these assumptions translate into wA > 0 and wN < 0. Parameter   0
represents child productivity measured in man-hours. The children of hunter-gatherers contribute
nothing to production, which we capture by setting  = 0. When agriculture is adopted,  rises to
a positive amount. Parameter  > 0 corresponds to the food requirements of a child.
The budget constraint can be rewritten as follows:
I  c+ prr + pnn;
where I = wT is total income, pr = w is the price of leisure, and pn =    w > 0 is the price of
children.
Finally, the following equation governs the population dynamics:
Nnext = nN;
where Nnext is the adult population of the next period.
In the short-run, population N is xed, and fertility n responds to income and prices. In the
long-run, N adjusts so that the wage w converges to the value at which the tribesmans optimal
decision is to bear children at the replacement rate, n = 1. These assumptions link our model to
the family of endogenous fertility models with Malthusian-Ricardian checks on population.2
Without loss of generality, let the tribesmans choices be summarized by the Marshallian de-
mands that stem from his utility function:
c = cm (pr; pn; I);
r = rm (pr; pn; I);
n = nm(pr; pn; I):
2Other examples are Ashraf and Galor (2008), Boldrin and Jones (2002), Eckstein et al. (1988), Galor and Weil
(2000), Lagerlöf (2003a, 2003b, 2005), and Nerlove et al. (1986), Zhang and Zhang (1997, 2005).
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2.2 E¤ects of the adoption of agriculture
We model the adoption of agriculture as two technological improvements: a positive shock to child
productivity, and a one-time increase in total factor productivity (TFP). We will explore the e¤ects
of each improvement separately.
First, we will show that a rise in the productivity of children will produce the stylized facts of
the Neolithic Revolution, provided that a set of plausible conditions hold. Second, we will show
that a one-time increase in TFP will produce a short-run increase in fertility and in utility but will
have no long-lasting e¤ects other than an increase in population.
The e¤ects of an increase in child productivity
Let A be constant. By totally di¤erentiating w(A;N) and the Marshallian demands with respect
to , we obtain a linear system for the e¤ects of an increase in child productivity:
w = wNN; (1)
c = c
m
pr w + c
m
pn  ( w   w) + cmI wT; (2)
r = r
m
pr w + r
m
pn  ( w   w) + rmI wT; (3)
n = n
m
pr w|{z}
dpr
d
+ nmpn  ( w   w)| {z }
dpn
d
+ nmI wT|{z}
dI
d
; (4)
where w, c, r, n, and N are the unknown total derivatives. The system is closed with N sr = 0
for the short-run and with nlr = 0 for the long-run, where superscripts sr and lr distinguish short-
run and long-run solutions. In other words, the population is xed in the short-run (i.e., N sr = 0),
but may change in the long-run as a consequence of todays fertility decisions. In the long-run, the
population must adjust so that the wage is just enough to persuade the tribesman to reproduce at
the replacement rate (i.e., nlr = 1, which entails nlr = 0).
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Initially, the tribesman hunts and gathers, so  = 0. Replacing  = 0 in equations (2)(4), we
obtain:
c = (c
m
pr + c
m
I T )w   wcmpn ; (5)
r = (r
m
pr + r
m
I T )w   wrmpn ; (6)
n = (n
m
pr + n
m
I T )w   wnmpn . (7)
From equations (1) and (7), together with condition N sr = 0, we obtain:
wsr = 0;
nsr =  wnmpn : (8)
The wage remains constant in the short-run (wsr = 0), since population is xed in the short-run.
Equation (8) implies that fertility n will increase in the short-run if  increases and the demand
for children has a negative slope: nmpn < 0.
Will the tribesman adopt agriculture? Yes, and this is why. The tribesmans wage remains
constant in the short-run, which implies that total income and the price of leisure remain constant
as well:
dI
d
sr = Twsr = 0;
dpr
d
sr = wsr = 0:
Adopting agriculture, however, increases , which brings the price of children down:
dpn
d
sr =  w < 0:
The fall in pn, while I and pr remain unchanged, pushes the tribesmans budget constraint outwards,
unambiguously increasing his utility: usr > 0.
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From equations (1) and (5)(7), together with condition nlr = 0, we obtain the long-run com-
parative statics:
wlr =
wnmpn
nmpr + n
m
I T
;
clr =
cmpr + c
m
I T
nmpr + n
m
I T
wnmpn   wcmpn ; (9)
rlr =
rmpr + r
m
I T
nmpr + n
m
I T
wnmpn   wrmpn ; (10)
Nlr =
wnmpn
wN  (nmpr + nmI T )
: (11)
Equations (8)(11) yield a set of conditions that su¢ ce to reproduce the stylized facts of the
Neolithic Revolution that is, a short-run rise in fertility (nsr > 0), a long-run increase in population
(N lr > 0), and long-term drops in food consumption and leisure (c
lr
 < 0 and r
lr
 < 0). The
conditions are:
1. Wages are decreasing in population: wN < 0 (the Ricardian assumption).
2. Children are ordinary goods: nmpn < 0.
3. Fertility is increasing in wages: nw = nmpr + Tn
m
I > 0 (the Malthusian assumption).
4. Consumption is a normal good and a gross substitute for leisure and children: cmI ; c
m
pr ; c
m
pn > 0.
5. Leisure is a gross substitute for children: rmpn > 0.
6. Leisure is decreasing in wages: rw = rmpr + r
m
I T < 0.
7. Leisure is more responsive to changes in wage than to changes in the price of children:
jrmpr + rmI T j > rmpn .
8. Fertility is more responsive to changes in the price of children than to changes in wage:
nmpr + n
m
I T < jnmpn j.
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The long-run fall in consumption and leisure, while fertility returns to its original level, implies
that the later generations of farmers will obtain a lower utility than did their hunter-gather pre-
decessors  that is, ulr < 0. Still, the later generations of farmers will not revert to hunting and
gathering, as that would increase the price of children while total income and the price of leisure
remain constant. The utility of farmers would thus fall in the short-run. Given their numbers, hunt-
ing and gathering is not an option for the farmers: they are trapped in an undesirable equilibrium
with plenty of people, low incomes, scarce food, and too much work.
What lies behind these puzzling results?
An increase in the productivity of children promotes a present and future rise in fertility, since
more productive children are cheaper:
dpn
d
sr = dpnd
lr =  w < 0:
However, equilibrium requires later generations to reproduce at the replacement rate (n = 1). Since
children will remain cheap in the long-run, the wage must fall below its original level (wlr < 0)
to induce future generations to limit their fertility to one child per capita. The fall in the wage is
achieved through the increase in population (N lr > 0) that results from a temporary increase in
fertility (nsr > 0).
In addition, the long-run reduction in the wage implies that the price of leisure will fall:
dpr
d
lr = wlr < 0:
Since food is a normal good and a gross substitute for leisure and for children, the long-run reduc-
tions in wI , pr and pn will all push food consumption downwards (clr < 0).
Two opposing forces act upon leisure in the long-run. On the one hand, leisure will be cheaper,
so the tribesmen will tend to rest more and work less. On the other hand, total income will
be lower and children will be cheaper; since leisure is a normal good and a gross substitute for
children, the tribesmen will want to reduce leisure and increase their working hours. Conditions 7
10
and 8 guarantee that the second e¤ect will dominate the rst, so leisure decreases in the long-run
(rlr < 0).
The e¤ects of improvements in food production technology
Let  be constant. By totally di¤erentiating w(A;N) and the Marshallian demands with respect
to A, we obtain a linear system for the e¤ects of improved food production technology:
wA = wA + wNNA;
cA = c
m
pr wA + c
m
pn  ( wA) + cmI wAT;
rA = r
m
pr wA + r
m
pn  ( wA) + rmI wAT;
nA = n
m
pr wA|{z}
dpr
dA
+ nmpn  ( wA)| {z }
dpn
dA
+ nmI wAT| {z }
dI
dA
;
where wA, cA, rA, nA, and NA are the unknown total derivatives. The system is closed with
N srA = 0 for the short-run and with n
lr
A = 0 for the long-run.
Using  = 0, the system reaches:
wA = wA + wNNA;
cA = c
m
pr wA + c
m
I wAT;
rA = r
m
pr wA + r
m
I wAT;
nA = n
m
prwA + n
m
I wAT:
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And, under the conditions stated in the previous section, we obtain:
wsrA = wA > 0;
nsrA = n
m
prwA + n
m
I wAT > 0;
wlrA = c
lr
A = r
lr
A = n
lr
A = 0;
NlrA =  
wA
wN
> 0:
It follows that wages increase in the short-run and so does fertility. The only long-run e¤ect of a
higher TFP is an increase in population. Consumption and leisure do not change in the long-run,
since neither total income nor prices change:
dI
dA
lr = TwlrA = 0;
dpr
dA
lr = wlrA = 0;
dpn
dA
lr = 0:
This is the typical Malthusian result.
For any given population level, the TFP of agriculture is higher than the TFP of hunting and
gathering. Therefore, a generation of farmers who reverted to hunting and gathering would see
their wages fall. This contributes to the stickiness of agriculture.
3 An example: inelastic supply of labor
The purpose of this simple example is to clarify the inner mechanics of the model. As the e¤ects
of a rise in TFP are intuitive, we will only discuss here the short-run and long-run e¤ects of an
increase in child productivity. We will assume that the tribesman supplies a xed amount of labor.
These assumption will allow us to concentrate on the behavior of consumption and on changes in
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utility. We will also assume that consumption and children are ordinary goods, normal goods, and
gross substitutes of each other.
Initially, the tribe hunts and gathers, and the wage is just enough to keep the population
constant; given his income and the prices he faces, each tribesman chooses to bear one child. The
tribesmans choice is represented by bundle B0 in Figure 1. When the tribe adopts agriculture,
children become more productive. This is equivalent to a reduction in the price of children, so the
budget constraint rotates outwards from BC0 to BCsr. Since children are ordinary, the tribesman
switches to bundle Bsr, which contains more children than bundle B0. And, since consumption and
children are gross substitutes, bundle Bsr contains less consumption than bundle B0. Because BCsr
is less stringent than BC0, the change is welfare enhancing: utility rises from u0 to usr. [This point
was previously made by Locay (1989, pp. 74647).]
In the short-run, fertility rises above the replacement rate, so the population begins to grow.
As a result, the descendants of the original farmers earn ever lower wages, so the budget constraint
moves inwards. The typical tribesman consumes progressively less, and his fertility falls. Both
the fall in consumption and the fall in fertility are a consequence of normality. When the budget
constraint reaches BClr, the tribesman chooses bundle Blr, which again contains just one child.
Population restabilizes, only at a higher level. The wage, consumption, and utility are lower than
they were before the price shock, since Blr is to the left of B0. [Locay (1989), p. 748, speculates
that consumption and utility may fall in the long-run, but he does not prove or explain why they
must fall in the long-run when both goods are normal.]
Why should Blr contain less consumption than B0? We argue by contradiction. Suppose that
BClr has settled to the right of bundle B0  Figure 2 represents this situation. In equilibrium, the
tribesman must choose bundle Blr; otherwise, the population would grow or shrink. This bundle
contains more consumption than bundle B0. Now imagine that the wage falls for some reason (e.g., a
negative productivity shock), pushing the budget constraint inwards to BC1, which contains bundle
B0. Before the price shock, the tribesman revealed that he preferred bundle B0 to all bundles that
lay on the thin segment of BC1. Therefore, he will now choose a bundle that lies on the thick
segment of BC1. He will not choose B0, because that would imply that indi¤erence curves cross at
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B0. Therefore, he must choose a bundle that lies on the thick segment of BC1 and that is strictly
above the dashed line. But the wage is lower in BC1 than it is in BClr. And, since children are
normal goods, the tribesman must choose a bundle on BC1 that contains fewer children than Blr
 that is, a bundle that lies on the thin segment of BC and that is strictly below the dashed line. We
have reached a contradiction. Therefore, if children are normal, the wage and consumption will fall
in the long-run whenever the price of children decreases, as occurs when child productivity rises.
14
u0
n
c
uSR
BC0
BCSRuLR
1
BLR
BSR
B0
BCLR
Figure 1: Short-run and long-run e¤ects of a fall in the price of children when the supply of labor
is inelastic, consumption and children are normal goods, and both goods are substitutes of each
other.
n
c
BC0
1
BLRB0
BCLRBC1
Figure 2: If children are normal, the wages and consumption will fall in the long run whenever the
price of children decreases.
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